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Duquesne Law Review
Volume 7, Number 2, Winter 1968-1969
The Americanization of Renvoi
David E. Seidelson*
Almost since its first introduction to American jurisprudence, ren-
voi has been looked upon as a dirty word by most courts in this country.
in most circumstances.' There are probably several reasons for this
disdain. First, it is a foreign word, and if there is one thing a judge,
confronted with a delicate choice of law problem involving the po-
tential application of the law of another jurisdiction, can do without,
it's a foreign word. But that problem is fairly easy to resolve. Simply
take away its italicization, and renvoi becomes just another word ab-
sorbed into the language. A second reason for renvoi's general rejec-
tion is a little more difficult to overcome. One suspects that some
* Professor of Law, George Washington University.
1. In 1938 Dean Griswold wrote that "Forty years have now passed since the French
word 'renvoi' first made its appearance in English legal print." Griswold, Renvoi Re-
visited, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1938). In reviewing the scholarly writing about renvoi,
Dean Griswold found that "the legal writers, though they fall just short of being
unanimous, seem overwhelmingly, both in their number and in their certainty, in favor
of the conclusion that English and American courts do and should 'reject the renvoi.' " Id.
at 1170. The writers Dean Griswold found to be opposed to renvoi included Bate, Ab-
bot, Lorenzen, Beale and Goodrich. Id. at 1170-72. Their reasons for this opposition went
from " 'the Renvoi-theory is inconsistent with' fundamental doctrines of English law,"
through "its introduction into our law would be most unfortunate," to "A mere state-
ment of the operation of the 'renvoi doctrine' should be sufficient to condemn it." Id. at
1170-72. Judge Goodrich, using language more suited to an encyclical than to a discus-
sion of legal theory, apparently viewed renvoi as a pernicious threat to the subsistence of
conflict of laws jurisprudence: "[I]t seems important to know chiefly to avoid its uncon-
scious acceptance." Id. at 1172. Undaunted, Dean Griswold concluded his article by ex-
pressing his gratitude to those who had previously examined renvoi, and by suggesting
that "there are many situations where satisfactory solutions to puzzling 'problems can be
worked out by looking to the 'whole law' of a country designated by a local choice of
law rule, and then reaching the same result which would be reached by the courts of
that country." Id. at 1208.
Thirty years after the publication of Dean Griswold's article, the present author
humbly suggests that there may, indeed, be a place for renvoi in resolving choice of law
problems confronting state and federal courts in the United States.
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judges may not be entirely. clear about how renvoi functions. Pejora-
tive characterizations like "international lawn tennis" or "circulus
inextrabilis," and misleading phrases like "a double renvoi" or "a
renvoi and a half," encountered in law school or in independent
reading may have persuaded some judges that renvoi results only in an
accretion of cases unresolved because of an endless failure to reach a
body of dispositive law,2 or in an arbitrarily determined number of
feckless trips from indicative law3 to indicative law as a condition
precedent to the application of some dispositive law. It's almost as-
tounding that the majority opinion in the Haumschild4 case, a land-
mark decision in the utilization of an interest oriented approach to
the resolution of a choice of law problem, states and accepts this view
of renvoi:
- The reason why the authorities on conflict of laws almost uni-
versally reject the renvoi doctrine (permitting a court. of the forum.
state to apply the conflict of laws principle of a foreign state)• is
that it is likely to result in the court pursuing a course equivalent
to a never ending circle.5
To overcome that basis for judicial rejection of renvoi, it becomes
necessary to determine jus.t what renvoi is and how it operates.
Although the author's interest in renvoi is predicated on its use as a
potential instrument for the resolution of American choice of law
problems, custom and tradition virtually dictate that a discussion of
renvoi begin with a set of operative facts laid before a French court.
The. classic facts are these: An English national dies intestate domiciled
in France, leaving an estate which includes movable personal property.
The issue before, the French court is: What law should govern the
distribution of that portion of decedent's estate?8 French indicative
2. The phrase "dispositive law" describes "those rules which are used to determine the
nature of rights arising from a fact-group, i.e., those which dispose of a claim." Taintor,
Foreign Judgment in Rem: Full Faith and Credit v. Res Judicata in Personam, 8 U. Pirr.
L. REV. 223, 233, n.58 (1942). It is thought that "dispositive law" is more accurate and
useful than such phrases as "municipal law" or "internal law."3. The phrase "indicative law" is intended to refer to "those rules which indicate
the system of dispositive rules which is to be applied." Taintor, supra note 2. It is
thought that "indicative law" is simpler and no less descriptive than such phrases as
"conflict-of-laws laws" or "conflict-of-laws rules." The author is indebted to the late Dean
Taintor for creation of the phrases.
"4. Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
5. Id. at 141-42, 95 N.W.2d at 820.
6. Dean Griswold utilized a similar set of operative facts but put them before an
English court, with the explanation that "the example put is taken simply because it is
convenient and readily understood; but it should not be inferred that there is anything
'international' or 'foreign'"about the situation. The basic problem- can arise (and does
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law provides -that. the distribution of a decedent's estate should. be,
governed by the law of decedent's nationality, English indicative law
says that the distribution of a-decedent's estate should be governed by
the law of decedent's domicile. In the first instance, the French court
confronted with this- choice of law problem will look to French indi-
cative. law, just as any forum faced with a choice of law problem must
begin by looking to its own indicative law. The French court finds in.
French indicative -law. a reference to English. law. But what English-
law, English dispositive -law only, or the total English law, including
English indicative law? Renvoi says the reference is to the total English
law. Naturally, a court finding a reference to the total law of another
state should look first to the indicative law of that other state. When
the French court looks to English indicative law, it finds a reference to
lex domicilii, the law of France, Were this an old-time Pete Smitl
short subject, -this would be the point -where the narrator would ask
plaintively, "What's- he going to do now?"
The alternatives confronting the French judge are to (1) take the
English law's reference to French law as a reference to the dispositive
law of France, apply that law and dispose of the issue, or (2) take the
reference to French law as a reference to the total law of France, look
to French indicative law, find there a reference back to English indi-
cative law and mount the merry-go-round. Of course, the French judge
will select the first alternative and thus resolve the problem. That
selection results not merely as-a means of avoiding the "never ending
circle" nor as a device for applying the. comfortably familiar lex fori.
Why the French judge selects the.first alternative goes to the essence of
renvoi.
A preliminary "why.' question must be why French indicative law
referred .the court to the lawa of decedent's nationality. Presumably,
that indicative law exists, because of the forum's- conscious determina-
tion that the sta-te-of nationality has the -most .intimate concern with
and interest in. the. distribution of a decedent's. estate. That concern
and interest. comprise the: raison -d'etre:-. for the indicative -law, More-
over, to . forum, engaging -in renvoi ;inr such a c~ase, the concern and.
interest of the state of nationality are so significant that .the forum,
after finding the initial reference in its own. indicative law to the law
perhaps oftener than is suspected) just as well between states of the United States."
Griswold, supra note 1, at 1166, n.5. Cf. In re Annesley, Court of Appeal [1926] 1 Ch. 692.-
The present author: eleted to lay the facts 'before a' French court tb achieve a forum
presumably willing to play renvoi in limine.
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of the state of nationality, determines to dispose of the issue as it would
be resolved by a court sitting in the state of nationality. In effect, the
French court puts itself in the shoes of an English court and disposes
of the issue accordingly. To accomplish this, the French court must
determine how an English court would decide the issue. That deter-
mination results from an examination of English cases. It is that exam-
ination which persuades the French court that an English court faced
with the same set of operative facts would resolve the issue of the dis-
tribution of decedent's estate by the application of French dispositive
law. Consequently, the French court utilizes French dispositive law
to determine the manner of distribution.
The ultimate application of French dispositive law is not the
product of a desperate need to find a centrifugal force sufficient to
release the court from some perpetual carousel, or a devious desire to
apply lex fori, or an arbitrarily designated number of trips across
the English Channel. It is the result of the forum's determination that
a court sitting in the state referred to by the forum's indicative law
would apply French dispositive law. In this manner the forum succeeds
in giving full effect to the law of the state referred to by its own
indicative law.
Nothing in that approach should be entirely alien to any American
lawyer or judge. It is the same approach imposed by the Supreme
Court on federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction. Each federal
court is required to apply the substantive law of the state in which it
sits,7 and the substantive law of the state includes its indicative law.8
Thus, a federal court sitting in State A and hearing a diversity case
must resolve substantive issues in the case pursuant to the law of
State A. If the case presents a choice of law problem, the federal court
must utilize the indicative law of State A. That indicative law may
refer the court to the dispositive law of State B, that is, the federal
court may determine that the highest appellate court of State A would
resolve the choice of law problem by use of an indicative law resulting
in the ultimate application of the dispositive law of State B. If so, the
federal court will resolve the issue by the application of the dispositive
law of State B.
7. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a more recent "refinement" of Erie,
see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
8. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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Should the federal court discover that the highest appellate court
of State A has never decided the choice of law problem presented in
the diversity case, the federal court must make an educated and judi-
cial guess as to the manner in which that state court would decide the
problem and apply the dispositive law which it thus determines would
be applied by State A's court. It may guess wrong, which is to say, that
when the highest appellate court of State A subsequently decides the
issue it does so by the fashioning of an indicative law different from
that which the federal court utilized, leading to the application of a
dispositive law different from that applied by the federal court. With
that precedent as guidance, should the federal court again be con-
fronted with the same choice of law problem, it will abandon its
earlier (and erroneous) guess and utilize the indicative law fashioned
by the state court, thus applying the dispositive law indicated as proper
by the state court.
Similarly, a state forum desirous of playing renvoi with State A may
find that the highest appellate court of State A has never resolved the
present choice of law problem; there is no indicative law precedent
in State A. In that event, the forum makes its educated and judicial
guess as to the indicative law State A's court would utilize and applies
the dispositive law so indicated. If the forum's guess is incorrect-as
determined by a subsequent decision of the highest appellate court of
State A-the next time the forum faces the same choice of law prob-
lem in playing renvoi with State A, the forum will utilize State A's
precedent and resolve the issue as a court sitting in State A would.
A renvoi similar to that employed by federal courts exercising diver-
sity jurisdiction is used by federal courts hearing Federal Tort Claims
Act 9 cases. The Act, containing its own indicative law, provides that
the liability of the United States shall be determined "in accordance
with the law of the place where the [negligent or wrongful] act or
omission occurred."'1 Prior to the Court's decision in Richards v.
United States," federal courts confronted with that indicative law
attempted to determine whether "law" in the statute referred only to
the dispositive law of the state where the act or omission occurred or
to the total law, including the indicative law, of that state. Richards
9. 28 U.S.C. §1346 (b) (1964).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
11. 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
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resolved the division among the federal circuits by holding that the
reference was to the total law of that state. Thus, in Richards, a wrong-
ful death action arising out of an airplane crash, where the govern-
ment's alleged negligence occurred in Oklahoma, which had no ceiling
on wrongful death action recoveries, and the death producing injury
occurred -in Missouri, which had a $15,000 ceiling on such recoveries,
the Court held that whether or not the ceiling was applicable was to
be determined by the total law of Oklahoma. In looking to the indic-
ative.law of Oklahoma, the Court found that that issue would be
resolved by an Oklahoma court by application .of the dispositive law
of the state where the death producing injury occurred. Since Mis-
souri's dispositive law had a ceiling on wrongful death action recover-
ies, the ceiling was imposed.
Consequently, in diversity cases (since Klaxon) and FTCA cases
(since Richards), federal courts have played renvoi. That acquired ex-
perience should have eliminated much of the awesome mystique which
once surrounded renvoi.
State courts, too, have had some limited experience in playing ren-
voi. Apparently in recognition of the intimacy of interest between
each state and land situated in that state, state courts have been willing
to engage in renvoi when faced with cases involving title to land. That
willingness has extended even to cases where the land was located in
a foreign country. In Schneider's Estate,'2 one of the most frequently
cited cases, the forum ( a New York Surrogate's Court) determined the
validity of the will of testator, who had died domiciled in New York,
as to land situated in. Switzerland pursuant to the indicative law of
Switzerland.- Having found that a Swiss court would have resolved the
issue by the application of the dispositive law of testator's domicile,
the New York court did just that .3
The Schneider opinion cited two decisions. of the New York Court
of Appeals in which the forum determined the validity of divorce
decrees by the "application of foreign conflict of laws rules.'1 4 Use of
renvoi in -that situation has had the approval of the. Restatement since
1934.15
12. 198 Misc. 1017, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1950).
13. It has been suggested that the court in Schneider misconstrued Swiss law Falcon-
bridge, Renvoi in New York and Elsewhere, 6 VAND. L. REV. 708, 730-31 (1953).
14. In re Schneider's Estate, 198 Misc. at 1023, 96 N.Y.S. 2d at 659. The two cases
cited were Ball v. Cross, 231 N.Y. 329, 132 N.E. 106 (1921),*and Dean v. Dean, 241 N.Y.
240, 149 N.E. 844 (1925).
15. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8 (1934).
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.It would thus appear that, despite the general.disdain toward renvoi
in the United States, courts in this country, both federal and state,
have in fact ulitized it in resolving choice of law problems. It remains
to be determined to what extent further use of renvoi would be ap-
propriate. In attempting to make that determination, it may be helpful
to understand why renvoi has been adopted in those situations where
American courts already use it.
In diversity cases, utilization of the indicative law of the state in
'which the federal court sits obviously resulted from a determination
that such an approach would diminish substantially the difference in
outcome of a given case tried in a state or federal forum. That diminu-
tion of difference in outcome has been deemed appropriate, and even
constitutionally necessary,16 in order to discourage forum shopping
between state and federal courts in diversity cases where the federal
court may be characterized as a mere alternative forum. In such cases,
the overriding'state interest-and the lack of federal interest-in the
non-federal claim has been recognized and given effect by the use of
renvoi.
In FTCA cases, there is an inherent federal interest: the United
States is the defendant. Yet, the Act purports to subject the sovereignty
to liability as if it were "a private person." A private person sued in
a non-federal tort action would not enjoy any special treatment arising
from federal law; he would have his liability determined by state law.
The Richards decision noted this axiom.' 7 In addition, the Richards
opinion demonstrated a sensitivity to the maintenance of an appro-
priate federalism, one not weakened by an overreaching of the federal
government resulting in abrogation of state policies.'8 And finally,
Richards recognized and apparently approved the rapidly developing
interest oriented approach taken by state courts in resolving choice of
law problems; the Court expressed its unwillingness "to saddle the
16. "[T]he unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear...."
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938). "We are of opinion that the prohibi-
tion declared in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins ... . against such independent determination
by the federal courts, extends to the field of conflict of laws." Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
17. "First, our interpretation enables the federal courts to treat the United States as a
'private individual under like circumstances,' and thus is consistent with the Act con-
sidered as a whole.", Richsfds v. United States, 369 U.S. at 11.
18. "It is evident that the Act was not patterned to operate with complete indepen-
dence from the principles of'law developed in the common law and refined by statute
and judicial decision in the various States. Rather, it was designed to build upon the
legal relationships formulated and characterized by the States, and, to that extent, the
.statutory scheme is exemplary of the generally interstitial character of federal law." Id. at
6,7.
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Act with an interpretation that would prevent the federal courts from
implementing this policy in choice-of-law rules where the State in
which the negligence occurred has adopted it."'19 Thus, the Richards
decision to play renvoi in FTCA cases apparently arose from the
Court's recognition that, notwithstanding the United States is the
defendant, the overriding interests in determining the existence and
extent of the defendant's liability are state, rather than federal-absent
any contrary indication in the Act.
In cases involving title to land or the validity of divorce decrees,
the overriding respective interests of the situs state or the state of the
parties' domicile have long been recognized.
This general conclusion emerges from the instances in which
American courts presently play renvoi: Renvoi is most appropriate in a
case in which the state to which the forum is referred by the forum's
indicative law has an overriding interest in the resolution of the
specific issue presented. In order to give appropriate effect to that over-
riding interest, the forum is willing to utilize the indicative law of that
other state, or, to phrase it another way, to resolve the specific issue as
it would be resolved by a court sitting in that other state. Applying
this general conclusion, it is now proper to ask in what other cases
would it be appropriate to utilize renvoi to resolve choice of law
problems.
An interesting starting point is Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.2 0
Gore arose out of the same airplane catastrophe which produced the
Kilberg21 and Pearson22 decisions, both of which refused to impose the
ceiling on recovery contained in the wrongful death act of Massachu-
setts (locus delicti) in actions arising out of the deaths of New York
domiciliaries. Defendant attempted to distinguish Gore on the ground
that, after the death of Mr. Gore, his wife and minor children aban-
doned their New York domicile and became domiciled in Maryland.
The court, finding decedent's domicile at the time of death the critical
factor in determining which state's law was referred to by New York's
indicative law (lex domicilii),23 refused to accept defendant's contention.
19. Id. at 12, 13.
20. 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967).
21. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526
(1961).
22. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 912 (1963).
23. In determining that decedent's domicile at the time of his death was the critical
factor, the court emphasized the interest of the domicile state in encouraging carriers
and others to be careful in their operations and conduct for the sake of protecting the
208
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Assume, however, that Mr. Gore had been domiciled in Maryland at
the time of his death. Then, presumably, the forum would have
state's domiciliaries. This emphasis on conduct regulation may have been misplaced, for
two reasons.
First, it seems strange to conclude that the purpose underlying New York's "no ceiling"
law is a conduct regulating one. If applied to the specific facts of the Gore case, that
conclusion suggests that the degree of care exercised by Northeast would be determined
by the ratio between the number of passengers from "no ceiling" states and the number
of passengers from "ceiling" states aboard the New York to Massachusetts flight, with
the degree of care being enhanced by the greater number of "no ceiling" passengers.
That proposition is ludicrous in its mere statement. It becomes hardly less ludicrous
when applied more generally. For example, the court's conclusion suggests that Massa-
chusetts bus drivers would exercise greater care toward vehicles bearing New York license
plates than those bearing Massachusetts plates because the drivers of the former are more
likely to be from a "no ceiling" state than the drivers of the latter. The absurdity of
such reasoning becomes even more apparent with the inherent suggstion that Massachu-
setts bus drivers would exercise greater care toward New York pedestrians in Massachu-
setts than toward locally domiciled pedestrians.
Second, even accepting the court's awkward reading of New York's "no ceiling" law as
conduct regulating, it seems strange that such a reading should result in the application
of lex domicilii. The former rigid application of lex loci delicti to resolve all issues in a
tort case probably arose from a combination of the vested rights approach and the for-
um's recognition of each state's right to regulate conduct within its borders. The vested
rights theory has lost the doctrinal magic displayed in Slater v. Mexican National R.R.,
194 U.S. 120 (1904). See Seidelson, The Full Faith and Credit Clause: An Instrument for
Resolution of Intranational Conflicts Problems, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 554 (1964). Yet
each state continues to enjoy the right to regulate conduct within its borders as an in-
herent aspect of sovereignty. Since in a majority of tort cases defendant's culpable con-
duct and plaintiff's immediate injury coincide in time and place, when a court utilizes
lex loci delicti it is recognizing the right of the state where defendant's conduct occurred
to regulate that conduct. And such utilization is entirely appropriate to resolve an issue
which is essentially one of conduct regulation. Since the court in Gore saw fit to charac-
terize the specific issue involved as one going to conduct regulation, and since defendant's
allegedly culpable conduct presumably occurred in Massachusetts, it is strange to find the
court resolving the issue by the application of New York law.
It is suggested that the court could have arrived at the same conclusion by a different
mode of reasoning. When Mr. Gore decided to fly from New York to Massachusetts, he
had the opportunity of deciding whether or not to purchase flight insurance, and, as-
suming an affirmative decision, how much to purchase. In making those decisions, Mr.
Gore should have had the opportunity of considering some body of law which would
determine the approximate dollar value to his dependents of a wrongful death action in
the event of tragedy. At the very least, he should have had the opportunity of deter-
mining whether such an action would provide his dependents with an amount approxi-
mately equal to their economic loss or an amount arbitrarily limited by a ceiling on
recovery. The law most likely-and conveniently-to be considered would be that of his
domicile.
Admittedly, it is somewhat fictional to assume that the would-be commercial airplane
passenger is aware of the exact nature of the wrongful death action in his home state or
the approximate dollar value which a jury may fix on a particular case. Still, it is sub-
mitted that a fair number of such passengers have become aware of the presence or ab-
sence of recovery ceilings on wrongful death actions in their home states and of the gen-
eral amount which juries have returned in such actions. It is submitted, too, that this
general awareness may influence passengers' determinations of whether or not to purchase
flight insurance and, if so, how much.
In wrongful death actions not arising out of airplane disasters, the same general rea-
soning could apply. Each individual has the opportunity, subject to economics and the
state of his health, to determine how much life insurance to carry for the benefit of his
dependents. Similarly, each individual has the opportunity to consider the likelihood that
his death may "leave" his dependents a wrongful death action. The law of his home
state as to whether or not a ceiling will be imposed on wrongful death action recoveries
may influence his decision as to the amount of life insurance he will purchase.
209
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looked to the law of Maryland to determine whether or not to impose
the Massachusetts ceiling. It would have found two potentially in-
fluential factors in Maryland's law: (1) Maryland's dispositive law
contains no ceiling on wrongful death action recoveries, and (2)
Maryland's indicative law resolves issues in tort cases by application
of lex loci delicti.24 If the forum looked only to the dispositive law
of Maryland, it would impose no ceiling; if the forum looked to the
indicative law of Maryland (played renvoi), it would impose the
Massachusetts ceiling. Which would be the better approach?
The decisions in Kilberg, Pearson and Gore indicate that New York
has determined that the state of decedent's domicile has an overriding
interest in determining whether or not a ceiling on recovery should be
imposed in a wrongful death action. That interest has been recognized
as sufficiently dominant to overcome the former rigid application of
lex loci delicti, even where the state wherein the death producing in-
jury occurred has such a ceiling applicable to actions against common
carriers and the defendant is a common carrier incorporated in that
state. The resulting indicative law, lex domicilii, suggests that the state
of decedent's domicile should determine the propriety of imposing
such a ceiling.
In the hypothetical situation presented, if the forum looked only to
the dispositive law of Maryland, and imposed no ceiling, it would be
affording the plaintiff a different-and better-mode of treatment than
she would be afforded by a court sitting in Maryland. Because Mary-
land's indicative law would impose the ceiling, even in an action aris-
ing out of the death of a Maryland domiciliary, apparently Maryland
has determined that its interest as domicile is adequately served by the
application of the Massachusetts ceiling. Bearing in mind that the New
York indicative law referring the forum to Maryland is the product
of New York's determination that Maryland has the overriding interest
in the issue, why should the New York forum treat the plaintiff better
than she would be treated by a Maryland court?
Professor Herma Hill Kay recently suggested that it would be inap-
propriate for the forum to be influenced by the domicile's indicative
law because that indicative law may be the residuum of a rigid ap-
plication of lex loci delicti in tort cases, and not the product of a
conscious analysis of interests on the part of a court in the domicile
24. White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966), commented on in Note, 27 MD.
L. REv. 85 (1967).
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state.2 5 The suggestion makes a great'deal of sense. If Maryland's ad-
herence to lex loci delicti is merely a vestige from an earlier, less
sophisticated period of choice of law jurisprudence, and therefore does
not reflect Maryland's concern in protecting the interests of Maryland
domiciliaries, use of Maryland indicative law by an interest oriented
forum would frustrate the purposes underlying the more refined
method of resolving choice of law problems. (Of course, utilization
of a state's indicative law by the forum might be an effective stimulus
to encourage that other state to reexamine its indicative law and, if it
deems a change necessary and appropriate, effect it.) However, Mary-
land's adherence to lex loci delicti is not a judicial relic, unchallenged
and unexamined in light of modern developments in the resolution of
choice of law problems. In 1966, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in
White v. King,26 was compelled to decide between lex loci delicti or
the adoption of a different indicative law in a tort case involving Mary-
land domiciliaries. After noting several of the leading cases from other
states which had adopted the newer approach in tort cases involving
the potential applicability of a foreign guest statute (the issue before
the Maryland court) and the potential applicability of a foreign
ceiling on recoveries in wrongful death actions, the Maryland court
decided to retain lex loci delicti, even though it recognized that as a
consequence of its decision "hardship may result in a particular
case." 27 Obviously, the court's determination was a conscious decision
to utilize lex loci delicti even where Maryland domiciliaries were in-
volved and even though hardship to those domiciliaries might result
in a particular case. Given that state of the indicative law of Maryland,
it would seem appropriate for the forum in the hypothetical case under
examination to treat the plaintiff, a Maryland domiciliary, as she
would be treated by a Maryland court. The forum's indicative law
which referred to Maryland's law was bottomed on Maryland's over-
riding interest, as the state of domicile, in the issue presented. If
Maryland would impose the Massachusetts ceiling on recovery in a
wrongful death action arising out of the death of a Maryland domi-
ciliary-and White v. King suggests strongly that it would-there
seems little justification for the forum to do otherwise. Apparently, the
forum should look to Maryland's indicative law, i.e., play renvoi.
25. KAY, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. REv. 584, 589 (1968) n.31.
26. 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966).
27. id. at 255, 223 A.2d at 767.
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In Trarnontana v. Varig Airlines,28 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia was required to determine the
applicability of Brazil's ceiling on liability for injury or death arising
out of aviation accidents to a wrongful death action brought by the
widow of a Maryland domiciliary. The death occurred as the result
of a mid-air collision between a United States Navy airplane and an
airplane owned and operated by Brazil's national airline. The collision
occurred over Brazil while the Navy plane was flying from Buenos
Aires, Argentina, to Galeoa, Brazil, and the Brazilian plane was en route
from Campos, Brazil, to Rio de Janeiro. Vincent Tramontana was one
of eighteen members of the Navy Band who died in the collision.
Brazil's limitation on recovery was 100;000 cruzeiros ($170.00). "The
District Court, with Varig's consent, entered judgment in favor of
[plaintiff] in the amount of $170.00. . . . It awarded a judgment in
favor of Varig 'for all of the plaintiff's claim which exceeds the sum of
One Hundred Seventy Dollars....' ,29 Plaintiff appealed, asserting
that Brazil's ceiling on recovery was contrary to a "strong public policy
of the forum."30 Finding that the District of Columbia had no contacts
with or interest in the operative facts or the specific issue presented, the
court refused to ignore Brazil's ceiling. The court found that the
"forum qua forum" lacked an interest sufficient to justify supplanting
Brazil's ceiling with the District of Columbia's lack of such a ceiling.31
Following the lead of Kilberg (as refined in Pearson), the court looked
to the law of decedent's domicile, Maryland. The court determined
from an examination of Maryland statutory and decisional law32 that
had plaintiff brought her action before a Maryland court that court
probably would have imposed Brazil's ceiling on recovery; the forum
therefore imposed the ceiling. And that's renvoi. The forum looked to
the indicative law of decedent's domicile to determine whether or not
a court sitting in that state would impose the damage limitation. Find-
ing that it would, the forum did.
28. 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966).
29. Id. at 469.
30. Id. at 470.
31. Id. at 476. See Seidelson, Full Faith and Credit: A Modest Proposal. . . . Or Two,
31 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 462, 463-76 (1962). Subsequently, in Armiger v. Real S. A. Trans-
porteos Aereos, 377 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court found that Brazil's interest in
having its ceiling on recovery applied in actions against Brazil's national airline was
dominant over the interest of the domicile states of decedents regardless of the indicative
and dispositive laws of those states.
32. The Tramontana court's determination from existing Maryland law that Maryland
would adhere to lex loci delicti accurately presaged the Maryland Court of Appeals de-
cision in White v. King, supra note 24.
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In Reich v. Purcell,33 plaintiffs, father and son, brought a wrongful
death action arising out of an automobile collision which had oc-
curred in Missouri. The collision resulted in the deaths of Mrs. Reich
and one of her two sons. At the time of the death producing injuries,
the Reich family was domiciled in Ohio. At the time the action was
commenced in California, Mr. Reich and his surviving son were
domiciled in California. Defendant was a domiciliary of California en
route to an Illinois vacation at the time of the fatal collision. Missouri
has a $25,000 ceiling on wrongful death action recoveries. Neither
Ohio nor California has such a ceiling. Defendant asserted the ap-
plicability of the Missouri ceiling, and the trial court concurred
"because the accident occurred there. 3 4 On appeal, the Supreme Court
of California, per Justice Traynor, reversed.
Justice Traynor determined first that lex loci delicti was not con-
trolling as to the specific issue before the court. Next, he determined
that the issue should be resolved by the application of lex domicilii.
That raised the question of which domicile, Ohio (the Reich family
domicile when the collision occurred) or California (the surviving
Reich family domicile when the action was instituted). Justice Traynor
decided that the "residence and domicile at the time of the accident
are the relevant residence and domicile. ' 35 Having so decided, Justice
Traynor applied the dispositive law of Ohio and held the Missouri
ceiling inapplicable. In so doing, Justice Traynor noted that the court
was "giving effect to Ohio's interests in affording full recovery."36
Had Justice Traynor looked to Ohio's indicative law, he would have
found that it referred to the place where the injury occurred, even for
the purpose of determining whether or not a ceiling on wrongful death
action recoveries should be imposed and even in cases involving Ohio
domiciliaries as plaintiffs. At least, that is the manner in which a fed-
eral court sitting in Ohio and exercising diversity jurisdiction read
Ohio's indicative law in 1965 in Goranson v. United Air Lines, Inc.37
Goranson was a wrongful death action arising out of an airplane
crash in Virginia. Decedent was domiciled in Ohio at the time of his
death. Virginia had a $30,000 ceiling on wrongful death recoveries;
Ohio had no such limitation. Defendant asserted the applicability of
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33. 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967).
34. Id. at 33, 432 P.2d at 729.
35. Id. at 34, 432 P.2d at 730.
36. Id. at 35, 432 P.2d at 731.
37. 345 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 984 (1966).
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the ceiling. Plaintiff argued that the court should ignore the ceiling
because decedent had died an Ohio domiciliary. The court, noting
the "definite trend away, in tort cases, from the general rule of [lex
loci delicti]," 38s and citing many of the cases leading that trend, noted
also Ohio's continued adherence to lex loci delicti. Since the federal
court was compelled to apply Ohio's substantive law, dispositive and
indicative, it imposed the Virginia ceiling.
Assuming that the Goranson court's reading of Ohio indicative law
was accurate, an Ohio court confronted with the facts of Reich v.
Purcell would have imposed the Missouri ceiling on damages. As a
consequence of ignoring Ohio's indicative law, Justice Traynor, al-
though finding "Ohio's interests" to be dominant because decedents
and their family had been Ohio domiciliaries, treated the plaintiffs
differently (and far better) than they would have been treated by an
Ohio court. Since Justice Traynor found that California had "no in-
terest in applying its law" 39 and Missouri had "little or no interest"40
in the specific issue, it seems safe to conclude that he found Ohio's
interest as the state of domicile to be overriding. In such circum-
stances, it is submitted that the court should have utilized Ohio's
indicative law and played renvoi.
Another potential area for the use of renvoi exists in the matter of
determining the capacity of a married woman to contract. Assume that
State A's dispositive law imposes a contractual incapacity on married
women. However, State A's indicative law, even as regards married
women domiciled in State A, determines such capacity by looking to
either the place of contracting or the place of performance when such
a married woman contracts with one not domiciled in State A. De-
fendant, a married woman domiciled in State A, enters into a contract
with a State B domiciliary in State B to be performed in State B, and
fails to perform. Plaintiff sues defendant for the breach in a court
sitting in State X. Defendant pleads her incapacity. Assume that the
forum's indicative law refers the court to the law of the married
woman's domicile, presumably in'recognition of the .overriding interest
of that state in determining the contractual capacity of its married
women. Should the forum look only to State A's dispositive law-and
enter judgment for defendant--or should it look to State A's indicative
38. Id. at 752.
39. Reich v. Purcell, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34, 432 P.2d at 730, supra n.3.
40. Id. at 35. 432 P.2d at731. '
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law and find that defendant had capacity to contract? If the forum
did the former, it would be imposing an incapacity on a married
woman domiciled in State A which a court sitting in State A would
not impose in simliar circumstances, thereby frustrating the purpose
underlying the forum's indicative law and the policy of State A. And
in the operative facts presented, the forum would be treating defendant
better than she would be treated by a court sitting in State A, despite
the forum's determination that the specific issue is most intimately
connected with State A. Apparently, the latter course would be
preferable. By treating defendant as she would be treated by a court
sitting in State A, the forum would be giving appropriate effect to its
own indicative law (lex domicilii), the purpose underlying that indica-
tive law (the overriding interest of the state of domicile in the issue),
and the interest of State A (a less than absolute interest in imposing
the incapacity). Again, utilization of renvoi would appear meet.
Determination of the potential applicability of an interspousal (or
intrafamilial) immunity to tort liability may be another situation in
which renvoi would be appropriate. Assume that the dispositive law
of State A imposes no bar to such suits, but that the indicative law of
State A determines the applicability of such a prohibition in a choice
of law setting by application of lex loci delicti. Suppose that plaintiff
wife sues defendant husband (both domiciliaries of State A) for in-
juries suffered by her as a result of defendant's negligence in State B,
and the suit is brought in State X. If the indicative law of State X in
such a case is lex domicilii, two conclusions are apparent: (1) State X
has recognized the paramount interest of the marital domicile in the
resolution of the issue, and (2) State X's indicative law will refer the
court to the law of State A. If the forum looks only to State A's dis-
positive law, it will not impose the bar. If the forum looks to State
A's indicative law, it will dismiss the action. Assuming that State A's
indicative law is not a superannuated carry-over from an earlier era
of conflict resolution (to avoid Professor Kay's objection41), its exis-
tence coincidental with its dispositive law suggests that State A has
determined that its interest as domicile will be served best by per-
mitting interspousal tort suits except where such suits are prohibited
by the lex loci delicti. If the forum ignored State A's indicative law,
and permitted the suit, it would be frustrating the interest of State A
as determined by State A, thereby perverting the forum's own indica-
41. See note 25 supra, and accompanying text.
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tive law which is predicated on State A's interest, and treating wife
plaintiff better than she would be treated by a court sitting in State A,
her domicile. The interests of each of the states, and the expectations
of the parties (to the extent that any such valid expectations exist)
would be better met if the forum looked to and followed the indica-
tive law of State A. Another instance of renvoi.
Potential applicability of guest statutes may be yet another appro-
priate area for the use of renvoi. Assume that State A has a guest
statute, and that its indicative law points to the law of the state where
the injury to the guest occurred, for the purpose of determining the
applicability of a guest statute in a choice of law context. Assume, too,
that plaintiff guest is injured in State B as the result of defendant
host's negligent driving in State B. Defendant host is domiciled in
State A. State B has no guest statute. Plaintiff sues defendant in State
X. The forum's indicative law refers the court to the law of the state
where defendant's vehicle is garaged and presumably insured, State A.
If the forum looks to the dispositive law of State A, the guest statute
will apply. If the forum looks to the indicative law of State A, it will
find a reference to the law of State B, which has no guest statute.
Which course should the forum follow?
Presumably, the forum's indicative law is predicated on a conscious
determination that the state wherein the host's vehicle is garaged and
normally insured has the greatest interest in determining the applica-
bility of a guest statute. 42 That "state interest" may be stated with
greater refinement. The forum may have recognized that vehicle
owners and vehicle insurers are most likely to look to the law of the
owners' domicile (if, indeed, they look to any law) in determining,
respectively, how much liability insurance to purchase and how much
liability insurance should cost. In looking to the law of State A, are
the owner and his liability carrier likely to look only to the dispositive
42. In the author's view, this appears to be the soundest indicative law in resolving
the potential applicability of a guest statute, since it treats with the economic realities
of such statutes. It would appear to be the view ultimately taken by the New York
Court of Appeals. In Babcock v. Jackson, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963), the
"contacts" were so overwhelmingly with New York rather than Ontario (locus delicti) that
the court merely listed all of New York's interests, without determining which was most
critical. In Dym v. Gordon, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965), the court apparently
determined that the critical "contact" was with the state where the host-guest relation-
ship was entered into, and applied Colorado's guest statute. However, in Macey v. Roz-
bicki, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591, 221 N.E.2d 380 (1966), where the "contacts" were divided between
New York and Ontario (locus delicti), the court apparently decided that the most sig-
nificant interest was with the state in which host's car was garaged and presumably in-
sured (New York).
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law or to the indicative law as well? Practicality suggests that the
owner, in fact, will look to neither. The liability carrier, however, has
the opportunity, the capacity and the finesse to examine both. It may
then determine the relative frequency with which State A insureds
drive with guests in State A and drive with guests in other states
(which may not have guest statutes). It may then determine appro-
priate premium rates for State A insureds (subject, of course, to ap-
proval by the state's insurance commissioner).
If the forum resolves the choice of law issue by looking only to State
A's dispositive law, and, consequently, applies the guest statute, the
insurance carrier enjoys a windfall. It will be treated better than it
had a right to anticipate and better than it would be treated by a court
sitting in State A and hearing the same operative facts. If the forum
looks to State A's indicative law, and does not apply a guest statute,
the insurance carrier will be treated as it would have been treated by
a court sitting in State A and no worse than it should have contem-
plated. Moreover, by looking to State A's indicative law, the forum
will be giving effect to its own indicative law, which was predicated
on the paramount interest of State A, and will be giving exactly the
correct significance to State A's interest in the set of operative facts
presented.
A combination of the last two problems considered, potential ap-
plicability of an interspousal bar and of a guest statute, presents an
interesting situation. In Thompson v. Thompson,43 plaintiff wife sued
defendant husband for injuries sustained as a result of husband's
culpable conduct in the operation of an automobile. Husband and
wife were domiciled in New Hampshire, which permits interspousal
suits. Wife's injuries were sustained in Massachusetts, which prohibits
such suits. Utilizing an interest oriented approach to resolve the choice
of law problem, the New Hampshire court found that the state of
domicile had the dominant interest in the issue and held that the
action would lie. However, the court stated that wife could recover
only by proving that husband's conduct had been grossly negligent,
pursuant to the Massachusetts guest statute.
What would happen if, shortly after the Thompson decision, a simi-
lar set of operative facts came before a court in State X, assuming that
State X's indicative laws would determine both the applicability of the
interspousal bar and the guest statute by reference to lex domicilii?
43. 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963).
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As to the interspousal bar, the forum would encounter little difficulty.
Its indicative law reference to the law of New Hampshire, even if read
as a reference to New Hampshire's indicative law (as it probably
should be read), would lead the forum to the application of New
Hampshire's dispositive law and the non-application of the bar. But
how about the guest statute?
The forum's indicative law refers to New Hampshire. New Hamp-
shire's dispositive law has no guest statute. Yet, given the same opera-
tive facts, the highest appellate court of New Hampshire applied the
Massachusetts guest statute, i.e., even where New Hampshire domi-
ciliaries were involved, New Hampshire utilized the guest statute of
the locus delicti. That utilization is evidence that New Hampshire
determined in Thompson that its interest in the guest statute issue
was subservient to the interest of Massachusetts. Should not the forum,
having an indicative law bottomed on New Hampshire's interest, treat
that interest as New Hampshire would-and did? The answer would
seem to be yes. To ignore New Hampshire's indicative law, as evi-
denced in Thompson, would be to subvert the underlying purpose
of the forums' indicative law, inflate New Hampshire's interest beyond
that conceived by New Hampshire, and frustrate the expectations of
the parties-to the extent that they possessed viable expectations.
Moreover, Professor Kay's objection to the use of the indicative law of
the state referred to by the forum's indicative law would appear in-
applicable. The New Hampshire court's use of lex loci delicti in deter-
mining the applicability of the guest statute is not hoary precedent;
it occurred in 1964. In addition, and perhaps even more significant, it
occurred in a case in which the New Hampshire court considered and
utilized an interest oriented approach in resolving choice of law
problems. It is suggested that, in the case presented, the forum should
utilize New Hampshire's indicative law in determining the applica-
bility of the guest statute. That is to say, the forum should play renvoi.
If it does, it will impose the Massachusetts statute, just as the New
Hampshire court did in Thompson.
But, alas, two years after Thompson, the New Hampshire court de-
termined that applicability of a guest statute in similar circumstances
should be determined by lex domicilii. In Clark v. Clark,44 a New
Hampshire husband and wife began a drive from Lancaster, New
Hampshire, to Littleton, New Hampshire. Their route took them
44. 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).... . :.. . .. . .. ..
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through a portion of Vermont. While in Vermont, husband's alleged
negligence resulted in injuries to wife. She sued husband in New
Hampshire. Husband, through his liability carrier undoubtedly, as-
serted.the applicability of Vermont's guest statute, which required
','gross or wilfull negligence"45 as a condition precedent to a guest
recovery. Determination of the applicability of Vermont's guest statute
was certified to the New. Hampshire Supreme Court. The court deter-
mined that New Hampshire had the more significant interest in the
specific issue and held the Vermont statute inapplicable.
If, after Thompson and before Clark, the forum hearing the hypo-
thetical case presented immediately above had followed the author's
suggestion and looked to New Hampshire's indicative law in determin-
ing the applicability of the guest statute, would the forum have erred?
Of course not. It would have utilized the New Hampshire indicative
law then extant. Clark simply evidenced a change in that indicative
law. After Clark, a forum having a similar set of operative facts and
determined to play renvoi will know that New Hampshire's indicative
law in such a case results in the application of lex domicilii rather
than lex loci delicti.
Of course, it could be asserted that the Thompson decision was New
Hampshire's. first venture into an interest analysis in resolving choice
of law problems, and that it presaged a similar approach in resolving
other choice of law problems. Therefore, the argument presumably
would go, the State X forum should have anticipated the Clark de-
cision and applied New Hampshire law rather than Massachusetts
law in determining the applicability of the guest statute. The argument
has persuasiveness. Frankly, the author's reaction to Thompson was a
combination of pleasure in that the court used an interest oriented
approach in determining interspousal immunity and confounded dis-
pleasure that the same approach had not led to determining the in-
applicability of the Massachusetts guest statute. And, remaining per-
sonally frank, the author would have been willing to give odds that in
the foreseeable future New Hampshire would reach such a determina-
tion. Given those admissions by the author, what should be the reader's
reaction?
Two responses appear likely. First, one might conclude that Thomp-
son offered a persuasive evidentiary basis for Professor Kay's concern
that a court's -indicative law might not reflect the court's conscious
45. Id. at 351, 222 A.2d at 206.
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determination of the extent and degree of state interest in a specific
issue. If Thompson is so read, in connection with determining the
applicability of a guest statute, there would be reason for a forum
confronted with a similar case after Thompson (and before Clark) to
determine that the New Hampshire court had not meaningfully de-
cided New Hampshire's interest in the guest statute issue.46 But that
does not necessarily lead to an out-of-hand dismissal of renvoi. It means
only that New Hampshire, the state referred to by the forum's indica-
tive law, has not yet fashioned an appropriate indicative law in such
circumstances. In that case, the forum may (1) make an educated and
judicial guess as to what indicative law New Hampshire would fashion
in such circumstances, and utilize that indicative law, or (2) reject
renvoi and look directly to New Hampshire's dispositive law. Professor
Kay presumably would prefer the latter approach; the author prefers
the former. If the absence of a consciously determined indicative law
reflecting the court's concern over its state's interest in the problem
presented is the basis for Professor Kay's rejection of renvoi, two re-
lated questions arise: Should the forum play renvoi where the indica-
tive law of the state referred to is clearly one consciously determined
with due regard for the state's interest? The answer would appear to be
yes. Then, should the forum disavow the renvoi technique simply be-
cause the state referred to has no clear precedential indicative law?
The answer would appear to be no. If the interest of the state referred
to by the forum's indicative law is deemed sufficiently dominant to
cause the forum to resolve the issue as it would be resolved by a court
sitting in that other state, such resolution should not be avoided
because of difficulty in determining what that court would do.
Second, one might conclude that Thompson did result in a con-
sciously determined indicative law demonstrating that New Hampshire
had decided that its interest was subservient to that of Massachusetts
as to the guest statute issue. There is certainly language in the
Thompson opinion to justify such a conclusion.47 Accepting that con-
46. This conclusion might be supported by the opening sentence of the court's opin-
ion: "The only issue presented is whether a wife may maintain an action in this state to
recover for injuries allegedly caused by the gross negligence of her husband while oper-
ating a motor vehicle in Massachusetts, where it is held that no cause of action can arise
for such a wrong." Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963). But see
text at note 47 and note 47 infra.
47. "Under the law of Massachusetts, a defendant is liable to a guest-passenger for
negligent conduct in that jurisdiction if he was grossly negligent. That law should de-
termine the standard of care applicable to this defendant for his conduct." Thompson v.
Thompson, 105 N.H. at 89, 193 A.2d at 441.
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clusion, one is impelled toward the propriety of a forum hearing a
similar case, and finding a reference in its own indicative law to the
law of New Hamphire, applying the indicative law of New Hampshire
as evidenced in Thompson. That use of renvoi gives to New Hamp-
shire (the state referred to by the forum's indicative law) the precise
degree of determinative capacity which New Hampshire's court has
found appropriate to New Hampshire's interest. Even if the forum
believes (as the author did) that New Hampshire might subsequently
reevaluate its interest and change its indicative law accordingly, the
forum ought not to effect that change prematurely. To do so would
be to enlarge or contract New Hampshire's interest as that interest is
presently evidenced in New Hampshire's indicative law. To state the
effect in terms more specific to the case, it would give to New Hamp-
shire domiciliaries either more or less than New Hampshire would.
That effect would appear to be an irrational convolution when one
recalls that the forum's indicative law was predicated on New Hamp-
shire's interest as the domicile.
Earlier in this article it was noted that those cases wherein American
courts presently play renvoi can be characterized as those in which the
state to which the forum is referred by the forum's indicative law has
an overriding interest in the resolution of the specific issue presented.
In each of the cases subsequently discussed, where it was suggested
that further use of renvoi would be appropriate, the state to which the
forum was referred by its own indicative law was the state of domicile
of one or more of the parties. This suggests that the state of domicile
is likely to have the overriding interest in the resolution of issues
presented in many choice of law problems. The suggestion ought not
to be surprising. The nexus between a state and its domiciliaries is a
continuing and intimate one. In those cases in which the forum recog-
nizes that nexus as the critical factor in resolving a choice of law
problem, as evidenced by the forum's indicative law referring to the
state of domicile, the domicile's interest frequently will be overriding,
and the forum should recognize it as such. An appropriate mode of
effecting that recognition is the utilization of the total law of the state
of domicile, which really means utilization of its indicative law.
But what of those choice of law problems in which the competing
interests are so neatly balanced that no state can be said to have an
overriding interest? Should the forum examine the indicative law of
another state in those cases? One thing which can be said with cer-
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tainty is that regardless of how neatly balanced-the competing interests
may be, the forum is compelled to resolve the choice of law problem.
Such resolution will be relatively difficult. Consequently, the forum
should have the benefit of all legitimate information applicable to the
problem and its resolution. The indicative laws of the states whose
interests are in'competition may be helpful to the forum in weighing
the competing interests and resolving the choice of law problem. The
indicative laws of those other states may even assist the forum in
fashioning an appropriate indicative law of its own in the particular
case.
48
Assume these facts: plaintiff guest, domiciled in State A, sues de-
fendant host, domiciled in State B, for injuries received by plaintiff
due to defendant's negligent operation of his automobile in State C.
The trip began in State A and was intended to end in State B. State
C has a guest statute which holds the host immune from liability
unless his culpability exceeds negligence. Neither State A nor State B
has a guest statute. The action is brought in State X. That forum's
indicative law in determining the applicability of a guest statute in a
choice of law case is usually lex loci delicti, evidencing a decision- by
the court in State X that the state in which the injury occurred has the
most significant interest in the applicability or non-applicability of a
guest statute. (That the forum's indicative law is something other than
lex domicilii and the issue is not patently and necessarily one of con-
duct regulation suggest that the state referred to may have something
less than an overriding interest.) If the forum looks only to the dis-
positive law of State C, it will apply the statute. Suppose, however,
that the forum looks also to State C's indicative law, either because of
the intellectual curiosity of the judge or the insistence of counsel for
the plaintiff. And suppose further that the forum discovers the indica-
tive law of State C in such a case refers to the state in which the host-
48. "In a fully developed system of functional choice-of-law rules much vital informa-
tion would be stated in a jurisdiction's choice-of-law rules. In such a system, these rules
would be relatively particularized and nuanced; they should state fairly precisely whether
a jurisdiction wishes to regulate a given issue at all, and, if so, under what conditions.
[I]n those situations in which a true conflict does exist, the choice-of-law rules will
help . . . to define that conflict precisely and will suggest each jurisdiction's dominant
concern or concerns. In sum, considerable'significance could then be properly assigned to
each jurisdiction's choice-of-law rule. Our confidence would be much greater that we had
properly analyzed and understood the concerns that each jurisdiction involved had with
respect to the underlying transaction." von Mehren, The Renvoi and Its Relation to
Various Approaches to the Choice-of-Law Problem, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND
CONFLICrs LAW 380, 393-94 (1961).
The rapidly developing advances in state indicative laws and the enlightened views
evidenced in those laws suggest that courts are "ready" for such a utilization of renvoi.
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guest relationship was entered into by the parties, in this case, State A.
The forum is now confronted with several alternatives. It may ignore
State C's indicative law and utilize only State C's dispositive law, thus
applying the statute. It may play renvoi and utilize the indicative law
of State C, thus applying the dispositive law of State A and hold the
statute inapplicable. Or it may consider the indicative law of State C
for the purpose of determining the propriety of its own indicative law
in the particular case before the court.
If the court chooses the first alternative, and ignores State C's indic-
ative law, it will be excluding a factor having potential relevancy in
determining the significance of State C's interest in the issue. The
forum could have selected as its indicative law the law of the place
where the injury occurred (its existing selection), the law of the place
where the relationship arose (State C's indicative law), or the law of
the place where host's car is garaged and insured. Conceivably, the
forum's indicative law referring to State C and evidencing the forum's
decision that State C has the most significant interest could be affected
by State C's determination of the extent of its interest. Ignoring such
a factor seems to make little sense.
If the court chooses the second alternative and plays renvoi, it will
be evidencing a determination that State C's interest is overriding. As-
suming that the forum views the competing interests as neatly bal-
anced, that determination may not be acceptable to the forum. Despite
its existing indicative law pointing to State C, the forum's view of State
C's interest may be that, while that state's interest is the most signifi-
cant, it is not sufficiently overriding to justify the forum resolving the
choice of law problem as it would be resolved by a court sitting in
State C.
If the court chooses the third alternative, it will examine State C's
indicative law for the purpose of determining State C's interest in the
particular case, and the consequent propriety of the forum's indicative
law as applied to the particular case. When the forum looks to State
C's indicative law and finds that State C would not apply its guest
statute in the case presented, it has found a diminution of interest on
the part of State C. If the forum's indicative law (lex loci delicti) is
based on the forum's conclusion that guest statutes are "conduct regu-
lating, " 49 and therefore the place where the car was being operated
49. This was the view of the dissenting Justice in Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 358,
222 A.2d 205, 211 (1966)..
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when the injury occurred has the greatest interest, when it determines
that State C would not apply its guest statute to this case, it has discov-
ered a lack of interest on the part of State C to regulate conduct in the
operative facts presented. That diminution of interest on the part of
State C might induce the forum to find that the interest of State A,
where the relationship arose, or State B, where host's car is insured, is
more significant than the interest of State C. Should the forum arrive
at that conclusion, it might decide to fashion and apply an indicative
law in this case different from its general indicative law in guest stat-
ute cases.
Assume that the forum, after noting the diminution of State C's in-
terest as evidenced by State C's indicative law, considers the fashioning
of an indicative law which will refer the forum to the place where the
host-guest relationship arose, State A. This consideration could arise
from the diminution of State C's interest and the consequent relative
enhancement of State A's interest, plus the forum's recognition that
perhaps a significant purpose of a guest statute is regulation of the
host-guest relationship. That purpose suggests an indicative law refer-
ring to the place where the parties entered into the relationship. The
dispositive law of State A has no guest statute. Should the forum look
to State A's indicative law as well? Of course. Just as the indicative law
of State C had the effect of reducing State C's interest, as determined
by the forum, State A's indicative law may enhance or reduce its inter-
est, as viewed by the forum. Assume that State A's indicative law re-
fers to the place where the relationship arose. That indicative law
demonstrates that a court sitting in State A would apply State A law to
the specific issue presented, and that, in turn, evidences a significant
interest on the part of State A in the set of operative facts before the
forum. Consequently, the forum's examination of the indicative law of
State A has served to emphasize State A's interest in the issue, and, log-
ically, ought to persuade the forum of the propriety of fashioning an
indicative law which refers the forum to State A. Thus, the forum
might abandon its general indicative law in such cases and create an
indicative law which refers to the place where the host-guest relation-
ship arose for use in this particular case.
Since the forum is not now playing renvoi (because the forum de-
termined that the competing state interests were too neatly balanced
for any one state to have an overriding interest), its indicative law
will refer the court directly to the dispositive law of State A, and the
224
Vol. 7: 201, 1968-69
The Americanization of Renvoi
guest statute will be inapplicable. The fact that State A's indicative
law would have referred to State A's dispositive law doesn't mean the
forum is playing renvoi. Rather, that fact was significant only in assist-
ing the forum to determine the extent of interest of State A for the
purpose of fashioning an indicative law for use by the forum in the
particular case.
Now, however, assume that when the forum looks to State A's in-
dicative law it finds a reference to the place where the host's vehicle is
insured. In effect, the forum has discovered that a court sitting in State
A would not apply State A dispositive law to this case. That discovery
evidences a lessening of interest on the part of State A in the operative
facts. Such evidence may appropriately persuade the forum that per-
haps State B, where host's car is insured, may have an interest more
significant than State A or State C. If the forum is tentatively so per-
suaded, it should consider fashioning an indicative law in this case
which refers to State B. Once more, that consideration may lead the
forum to examine State B's indicative law for the purpose of deter-
mining the extent of State B's interest. If the forum finds that State B's
indicative law in such a case would refer to the place where host's car
is insured, it has found evidence of a heightened interest on the part of
State B. A court in State B confronted with this case would resolve the
specific issue by application of State B's dispositive law.
The forum may now be persuaded to fashion and use an indicative
law in the case before it which refers to State B, having determined
that State B's interest is paramount. If so, the forum will use its in-
dicative law as a reference to the dispositive law of State B, and hold
that no guest statute is applicable.
Another possibility suggests itself. The indicative law now fashioned
by the forum, which refers to the law of the place where host's car is
insured, is really an indicative law which refers to the law of host's
domicile. Since the indicative law used by the forum is lex domicilii,
should the forum play renvoi? If it does, the result will be the same-
application of State B's dispositive law and the non-application of the
guest statute. Therefore, does it matter whether or not the result is
achieved by the use of renvoi? It probably does.
If the forum had discovered that State B's indicative law in such a
case was lex loci delicti, and if the forum played renvoi, the forum
would have taken the reference from State B's indicative law to the
dispositive law of State C and applied State C's guest statute. Presum-
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ably, the forum would have played renvoi only if it had found that
State B's interest in the specific issue was overriding. That finding
would be consistent with a general indicative law of the forum in such
cases which referred to host's domicile, the place where his vehicle was
insured. But in the case presented, the forum's general indicative law in
such cases was lex loci delicti. Clearly, the forum did not consider the
interest of host's domicile to be overriding. Rather, it departed from
its general indicative law-and utilized lex domicilii--only after
weighing what it considered to be rather neatly balanced competing
interests among the various states, a process facilitated by an examina-
tion of the indicative law of each of the states. In such a case, examina-
tion of the indicative law of each of the states would seem entirely ap-
propriate as a means of aiding the forum in its determination of which
state's interest was paramount, and the consequent fashioning of the
most fitting indicative law for the forum. But given such a neatly bal-
anced set of interests on the part of several states (as viewed by the
forum), with no state having an overriding interest (as determined by
the forum), it might be inappropriate for the forum to play renvoi.
It was noted earlier in this article that given a guest statute in a
choice of law context and a forum whose indicative law referred to the
law of host's domicile, it would be appropriate for the forum to play
renvoi. In the hypothetical case examined immediately above, the
forum was confronted with a guest statute in a choice of law problem
and an indicative law which might refer to the law of host's domicile,
yet it was suggested that the forum could eschew renvoi. Are these two
conclusions inconsistent? Not really. In the earlier situation, the for-
um's indicative law (lex domicilii) was predicated on the forum's de-
termination that host's domicile has an overriding interest in the spe-
cific issue. That determination suggests the propriety of resolving the
issue as it would be resolved by a court sitting in the state of host's
domicile. In the latter case, the forum ultimately arrived at lex domi-
cilii only after examining the indicative and dispositive laws of each of
the states with competing interests for the purpose of fashioning an
appropriate indicative law of the forum for the particular case. In the
latter case, the forum's ultimate indicative law (lex domicilii) was not
predicated on the forum's determination that host's domicile had an
overriding interest in the specific issue; on the contrary, it resulted
from the forum's resolution of competing state interests which the
forum considered to be rather neatly balanced. That determination
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provides considerably less compulsion for resolving the issue as it
would be resolved by a court sitting in host's domicile state. Whether
the interest of the state referred to by the forum's indicative law is
overriding (in which case renvoi would seem appropriate), or merely
the most significant of several competing and neatly. balanced state in-
terests (in which case renvoi would be less appropriate), is a determina-
tion which may properly be made by the forum. It is, after all, a deter-
mination of the reasons underlying the forum's indicative law.
It is submitted that examination of the indicative laws of other states
in choice of law cases could serve two purposes for the forum. In those
cases where the forum's indicative law refers it to a state having an
overriding interest in the resolution of the specific issue, the forum
might well utilize the other state's indicative law for the purpose of
determining which dispositive law to apply. In such cases, that use of
renvoi (resolving the issue as it would be resolved by a court sitting in
the state having the overriding interest) would satisfy the reasons un-
derlying the forum's indicative law and give to the state with the over-
riding interest precisely the determinative quality which that state
would desire. In those cases where the forum finds a neatly balanced
set of competing state interests-with no state having an overriding
interest-the forum could utilize the indicative laws of the competing
states for the purpose of fashioning the most appropriate indicative
law of the forum for the particular case. Here, the forum, while not
playing renvoi, would use the indicative laws of the other states as aids
in weighing their neatly balanced interests. In this latter type of case,
a necessary and desirable concomitant would be the knowledge on the
part of each state that in the fashioning of its indicative law it is evi-
dencing its degree and extent of interest in the operative facts pre-
sented, a demonstration which courts in other states would utilize in
determining the nature of that interest. 50 That knowledge should serve
50. "A truly functional approach to choice-of-law problems would ultimately develop
rather particularized and informative choice-of-law rules. These rules would, in large
measure, set out the jurisdiction's thinking about the reach and force, in given multi-
jurisdictional situations, of the various policies that it holds. The difficult problem posed
by a functional analysis-understanding the application that another jurisdiction would
wish to give in a multijurisdictional situation to rules largely or wholly developed for
domestic situations-would thus be largely solved. Under such a system, the renvoi, if by
that is meant a consideration of the choice-of-law rules held by other concerned juris-
dictions, would constitute an essential ingredient in the handling of conflicts problems.
It would no longer seem an esoteric element in conflicts thinking, but would represent a
normal and necessary part of the analysis underlying a general functional approach as
well as a way of accumulating and transmitting the results of thinking about, and ex-
perimentation with, choice-of-law problems." von Mehren, supra note 48, at 394.
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as an appropriate stimulus for the courts of each state to fashion indic-
ative laws which accurately reflect the state's interest. In both cases,
the indicative laws of other states may be beneficial to the forum in re-
solving choice of law problems. That benefit ought not to be shunned
because of an outmoded view of renvoi or a baseless concern over the
consequences of the examination of foreign indicative laws.
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